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On the Value of Distributional Equality
Joseph Raz 1
Abstract: The paper returns to the question whether equality in
distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinisically
valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the
intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and
the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in
that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
-------------------------------------------------------------Hillel Steiner’s work never fails to inspire and challenge, and this is
true even of those who, like me, take issue with his views. We disagree
about two pillars of much political theorising: liberty and equality. Hillel
affirms, and I dispute, the intrinsic value of pure negative liberty and of its
equal distribution. He argued against my view and I replied briefly
before. 2 The following pages deal only with one of these issues. They
offer an argument against the intrinsic value of distributive equality in
sections 3 and 4, to which the preceding sections serve as an
introduction.
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1. The value of equality: clarifications
Like all aspirational 3 values and ideals which have taken root in human
history and acquired a wide following, the characterisation of the value
or ideal of equality, or of egalitarian principles, is fluid. This is partly
because the reasons which led many to a belief in equality are diverse.
And partly because as some versions of these beliefs come under
criticism new versions, designed to by-pass the criticism, emerge. This
process of refinement and improvement means that any hope of dealing
a knock-out blow to belief in the egalitarian ideal are chimerical. No such
aim is entertained for this essay. For that reason I make no attempt to
provide a taxonomy of egalitarian positions, and no arguments against
each one of them. My aim is to address the core view – however crudely
understood – which forms one of the two main ideals of equality, the
one I refer to as distributional equality.
When arguing against the validity of an ideal with deep historical roots
and considerable following one needs not only to provide reasons to
reject the ideal, one needs also to explain why, given its invalidity, it is so
popular. The hold belief in the ideal has on people suggests that there is
something to it. Perhaps it is valid after all. To establish that it is not we
need to understand why its validity appears plausible. We may be prone
to some reasoning fallacy leading us to endorse the ideal. But more often
than not the explanation lies elsewhere. Something of real value is
mistaken for the invalid ideal. I will gesture towards such an explanation
below. But in the main the explanation of error is not explored here.
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The focus is on reasons suggesting that there is no intrinsic value in
equality. 4
We need to narrow down the issue:
1) I will consider only the non-instrumental, or, as I shall refer to it, the
intrinsic, value of equality. There is no doubt that some equalities are
sometimes instrumentally valuable, that they are useful for securing
some valuable outcomes, or for avoiding bad ones. Often debates
about the value of equality are debates about whether equality in the
distribution of this or that has beneficial or adverse consequences.
But no such concerns will engage us here. 5
2) As mentioned this essay deals with distributive equality, that is with
the possibility that there are some things such that there is intrinsic
value in distributing them equally. In the history of the political and
theoretical uses of ‘equality’ distributive equality dominates. But there
is another claim: that certain creatures (people, citizens, all animals,
etc.) should be treated equally. I will not consider the value of equal
treatment.
3) Some writers suggest that one of these principles or ideals leads to
the other, for example that the value of some form of distributive
equality derives from the value of, or some principle of, equality of
treatment. I will not consider such claims. If distributive equality is
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not intrinsically valuable then it has no intrinsic value deriving from
the value of equality of treatment, though it may derive some
instrumental value in that way.
4) Any principle of distribution yields, when implemented or conformed
to, some pattern or other of distributive equality. That is, any
principle of distribution has as a by-product some form of equal
distribution. For example, think of a distribution of food resources
which leaves no one hungry (even though different people are given
different kinds and quantities of food). That distribution is also one in
which every person is equal to any other in being free of hunger. Or
think of a distribution of educational resources and opportunities by
which everyone can develop their abilities 6 and skills to their
maximum potential. That distribution, though it allocates different
educational resources and opportunities to different people, is also
one in which every person is equal to any other person in being able
to develop his or her abilities to their maximum potential.
Claims that such distributions are good or justified are sometimes
expressed as statements about equality: it is valuable that everyone
should be equally free from hunger, or that everyone should be
equally able to develop his or her potential. At other times some
such views are condemned as inegalitarian. Thus, a distribution of
educational resources and opportunities by abilities is sometimes
condemned as elitist. These terminological variations and their
rhetorical roots are of no concern to us here. What matters is that

6
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the factor which made the distribution good or valuable was not that
it was equal, but that it avoided hunger, or that it avoided the
inevitability of undeveloped abilities. How do I know that? Of course,
it is not my claim that there cannot be anyone who would think that
equality is all that matters in these cases. Rather, I speculate that
those who think that these two distributions are intrinsically good
are likely to think that they are good for two different reasons (one
to do with hunger, the other with being able to develop one’s
abilities 7 ) rather than because they maximise equality.
This diagnosis of their view will be refuted or confirmed by their
reaction to the following two cases: In the first case we know that at
some future time Jane will be the only person alive. We can do
something which will make sure that she will not be hungry. In the
second case we know that at some future time both Jane and John,
but no one else, will be alive. Whatever we do John will not be
hungry. There is something we can do which will make sure that Jane
is not hungry. In this second case we can act in order to achieve
equality (in freedom from hunger), but we cannot do so in the first
case, in which no distribution can be either equal or unequal. The
good of avoiding hunger is achievable in both. Those who think that
the reason to protect Jane from hunger in the first case is the same
as the reason to protect her from hunger in the second case show in
that that they take the avoidance of hunger rather than equality as
the good of the distribution. So far as they are concerned the equality
produced in successfully protecting people from hunger (i.e. that they
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are all equally protected) is neither here nor there. What matters is
that they are all protected from hunger. The views of such people are
of no interest to us when we explore the intrinsic value of equality.
They do not endorse that value.
Egalitarians are people who believe in the intrinsic value of
distributional equality of some good(s) and who take this value to be
of considerable importance. Necessarily, egalitarians are value
pluralists. It makes no sense to believe in the equality of what is itself
of no value, say the number of stars visible from a position 10 miles
to the east of one’s current situation. If the distributive equality of
anything is intrinsically valuable it must be something which is itself of
value (or disvalue) or something necessarily related to what is
intrinsically valuable. Hence egalitarians believe that there is at least
one other intrinsic value besides equality. It could be liberty, wellbeing, resources, or whatever. Their belief in the importance of the
intrinsic value of equality consists in believing that obtaining equality is
worth-while even if it means a significantly lower level of realisation
or instantiation of other values. There is no way of putting a precise
lower limit to the importance assigned to equality by anyone who
could be considered egalitarian, and no need to do so.
Needless to say egalitarianism is harder to establish and easier to
refute than the thesis that some equality has intrinsic distributional
value. In what follows I will argue that equality does not have intrinsic
distributional value. Given that the argument falls short of being a
proof it is worth bearing in mind that whatever its force against the
value of equality, it is likely to have – if at all plausible – an even
greater force against egalitarianism.
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Given that for the most part, only egalitarians believe in the
intrinsic value of equality, I will refer to any believer in the intrinsic
distributional value of equality as egalitarian.
2. The levelling down objection
A popular argument against the value of equality, now increasingly
recognised to be flawed, is known as the levelling down objection. I will
consider it using a variant of the previous example:
John & Jane: Suppose that it would be good if people were equal in
their possession of some good, say food. Suppose further that there are
two people, Jane and John, who are not so equal, Jane having more food
than John.
There are at least two ways of establishing equality of food between
them. One can deprive Jane of the amount of food she has more than
John, or give John that amount of food (for present purposes I will
ignore the possibility of splitting the difference between them). So far as
equality goes there is nothing to choose between these two ways of
securing it. Practicalities aside, they are equally good or acceptable ways
of achieving equality. This symmetry appears to many to be implausible.
The indifference between achieving equality by making people who are
better off worse off and making people who are worse off better off
appears counter-intuitive. Is not, they say, the whole point of equality to
improve the lot of the deprived and the dispossessed?
Supporters of equality have, however, pointed out that the objection is
invalid. It may reveal, of course, that the objectors do not really believe
in the value of equality. They may simply believe in the value of alleviating
poverty and deprivation. So do I, but that belief does not require
commitment to the intrinsic value of distributive equality, though current
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political rhetoric often obscures this point. The appeal of the levelling
down objection may therefore serve to separate the egalitarians from
others who are sometimes confused with them. However, as an
objection against the egalitarians it would not do.
Were it valid it would undermine any pluralistic view of values. 8 To see
why this is so think of any two independent intrinsic values of your
choice. I will take autonomy and a sense of physical well-being as
examples. I will assume that it is good to enjoy autonomy to a proper
degree – it does not matter what that is. So far as the value of autonomy
is concerned it does not matter if one reaches that degree by
diminishing one’s sense of physical well-being, or without such decline in
one’s sense of well-being. Similarly, in so far as one’s sense of physical
well-being is concerned it does not matter if one achieves it through
sacrificing a degree of autonomy or without such sacrifice. These points
are the precise analogues of the levelling down objection: in so far as
one is concerned exclusively with achieving equality it makes no
difference whether it is achieved at the expense of some other value or
not. This observation is close to a tautology. However, what matters,
according to all value pluralists, including egalitarians, is the instantiation
or realisation of all the values there are. Egalitarians believe that equality
is among them, but given that it is not alone, their overall view (the view
which takes account of all the values) is asymmetric: regarding any value

8

Egalitarian are, by necessity pluralists about value. According to them there is value only in
the distribution of something which is in itself of (some) intrinsic value, that is something
whose value is independent of equality. The full proof of this is somewhat complex, and
tiresome. The beginning of the proof is to note that there is no value in the equal distribution
of something which is itself neither good nor bad, like the number of hairs to be found on
one’s shirts at any given time. To be plausible at all the value of equality must relate to the
distribution of items like food, opportunities for valuable activities, freedom, and other things
of value independently of their distribution.
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it is better to realise it without compromising the realisation of any
other values rather than in ways which do compromise their realisation.
3. Is Equality Good for People?
The appeal of the levelling down objection may be due to failing to
distinguish between it and another, more promising criticism of
egalitarianism. The striking feature of egalitarianism which attracts the
levelling-down objection is that according to it things are better if Jane is
deprived of some of her food resources (the amount required to bring
her food resources level with John’s), and nothing else changes. In
rebuttal it is pointed out that the premises are false. It is not true that
nothing else changes. There is an additional, consequential, change,
namely that equality is established. The objection fails. But, as we saw, it
fails for an additional reason as well. Even if the premises were true the
conclusion (‘things are better …’) does not follow from the premises
(that depriving Jane of that amount of food will establish equality). The
premises only show that things will be better regarding equality. It does
not follow that they will be better overall.
Some of the objectors may persist and protest that things cannot be
better in any respect if one person is worse off and no one is better off.
This claim does not vindicate the levelling down objection in any
of the forms it is commonly given. But it reveals a common assumption
which is not always noticed by those who share it. At its crudest it is the
assumption that values are subservient to human interests. That
If realising or instantiating any putative value benefits no one, then
that putative value is no value. I’ll refer to that thought as the crude
and simple version of the Person-affecting condition.
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The objector points to the situation in which equality is established by
levelling down, i.e. by adversely affecting someone without benefiting
anyone, as proof that equality fails to meet the person-affecting
condition and is therefore of no value. I will call this the person-affecting
objection. Is it sound? Egalitarians may wish to pursue at least two
avenues of reply. First, they may wish to deny that equality does not
benefit people. Second, they may wish to reject the person-affecting
condition.
Given its historical and political background, egalitarianism may
well wish to pursue the first avenue even if the person-affecting
condition is false. Even if there are values which cannot benefit people
the view that equality is among them would surprise and disappoint most
egalitarians, as the ethos of egalitarianism is deeply humanist, that is
concerned with the fortunes of people. Be that as it may, does equality
benefit people?
The question is not whether realisation of equality is associated with
other changes which benefit people. The question is whether equality
itself benefits people. That is why the arguments turn on levelling down.
Securing equality between Jane and John by providing the latter with
more food is an example of a case in which improving the lot of a person
also happens to realise equality. But it is not the equality which improves
his lot. It is the extra food. And the food is not necessary for the
realisation of equality. Equality can be realised by denying Jane some of
the food she has and wasting it. Hence the argument that equality itself
does not benefit people, that it is indifferent to their fate. It violates the
person-affecting condition.
But have not the objectors been looking in the wrong place? If you
consider the food benefits for people then obviously equality itself does
10
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not benefit them, only food provides a food-benefit. We need to ignore
the coincidental benefits (where they exist) and ask whether equality
itself is a benefit. How can it be? One line of thought is to draw an
analogy with other ‘environmental’ benefits, as I will call benefits which
consists in nothing more than living in a certain environment, e.g. in a
beautiful mountainous valley. Just living there is a benefit. By and large
such environmental benefits are recognised by people. Even those who
prefer living in a big city with all its social and cultural amenities
recognise that those who would rather live in the mountainous valley
gain something which they lack. Nor is the benefit exhausted by the
opportunities the mountain provides: opportunities to climb the peaks,
to watch the birds, etc. Just living in those surroundings is of value.
So is life in a world in which distributional equality obtains a
benefit to its inhabitants in a similar way? It may be helpful here to
consider another example:
Galaxy: Imagine that a state of ideal equality prevails on our planet.
However, there is another planet, in a galaxy too remote for us to be
able to interact with, where there are human beings living in conditions
of ideal equality with each other, but whose conditions are not equal to
those of people on planet earth, not equal in the respect in which
equality is a good thing. The people in either planet do not know of the
existence of the other, nor can they find out (given the laws of nature).
Bertie is one of those people. He lives on earth.
The question is: Would Bertie benefit if the conditions of the
people on the other planet changed and became equal to the conditions
of his life (and that of other people on earth)? If he would benefit then
equality is not an environmental value. It is of the nature of the latter
that one benefits from the valuable condition (from the instantiation of
11
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the value) only if one is aware of the facts which constitute that
condition. One need not have the concepts MOUNTAIN, VALLEY,
FRESH AIR, NATURAL BEAUTY and the like to benefit from living in a
mountainous valley. But one has to be aware of the fact that one lives in
a mountainous valley. Moreover, ‘the awareness’ cannot consist merely
in believing, knowing or remembering that those facts obtain. It would
have to be linked to perceptual and sensual awareness of the relevant
valuable features of the environment. Two considerations explain these
points.
First, had one benefited from living in certain conditions merely in
virtue of believing them to be valuable then one could create values by
believing that they exist, but that is highly implausible. We need not deny
that beliefs can have a certain placebo effect, namely that (false) belief
that one lives in good conditions may well make one happy, or have
some other generally desirable psychological effects. Such phenomena do
not, however, make one’s beliefs in values self-verifying in any way.
Second, the explanation of the way we benefit from intrinsic
values which are environmental in character is that they combine two
features. As with other intrinsic values we benefit from them by
experiencing their presence. Unlike other intrinsic values our experience
of environmental values need not be through action, or activity, and
need not impose on our attention. It need not impede us from engaging
in any other actions, including mental acts. Sometimes we have more
intensive experiences, as when contemplating the landscape, a
contemplation which involves activities, absorbs our energies and
attention, and precludes some other activities and experiences. But this
need not be the case. The mark of environmental values is that the
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experience can be subliminal and leave us completely free to engage with
any activities open to us.
Back to Galaxy. If Bertie benefits from the equality which came to
reign in the world it is not because he experiences it. So if establishing
equality benefits him that is because the value of equality can benefit
people in other ways as well. I do not know of any explanation of the
way equality with the remote planet can benefit people which would
apply to Bertie. I will therefore assume that it does not.
It does not follow, however, that equality is not an environmental
value. Think of beautiful landscapes again. There may be beautiful
landscapes on some uninhabited planets. They are still beautiful even
though they never did, nor ever will, benefit anyone. In general the value
of anything of value does not disappear when it does not benefit anyone.
War and Peace would remain a good novel even if people were to read it
no more, and forget that it exists. The person-affecting condition does
not stipulate that every instance of a value actually benefits someone or
other. It merely states that
Person-affecting condition (first approximation): If V is a value
(a value property) then it is possible for some of its instantiations
to benefit people.
One aspect of the rationale for the person-affecting condition should be
noted here. Insisting on the condition implies that in some, yet to be
explained, way the point of intrinsic values is that people should relate to
them in appropriate ways. Values provide reasons, and, metaphorically
speaking, they are unfulfilled or wasted if those reasons are not
conformed to. Our current concern is that while any instantiation of a
value is an instantiation of a value regardless of whether or not anyone

13
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can benefit by it, the stringency or importance of the reasons we may
have to realise the value on a particular occasion, or to preserve its
instances, will depend on the benefit it brings to people. Therefore,
while possibly the equality of the conditions of people on Earth and on
the remote planet is valuable, the person-affecting condition implies that
there is little reason to bring it about or preserve it if it already exists, as
this particular instantiation of equality cannot benefit anyone.
But the question remains whether under some circumstances living in
conditions of equality benefits people, and I will now assume that if it
does that is due to their experiences of equality, or of the egalitarian
aspect of life in conditions of equality. But what is that experience?
The problem with Galaxy is not merely that Bertie does not know
of the remote planet, but that even if he did its existence is unlikely to
yield any relevant experience of either equality or inequality. He may be
pleased or displeased to know of the inequality and the subsequent
equality in conditions of life between Earth and that planet, but that is
not enough to establish that Equality meets the person-affecting
condition. Perhaps the egalitarian experience relates to the experience
of living in a community in which equality prevails. I do not mean a
particularly small or cohesive community. Any social environment living
in which is intrinsically meaningful (for good or ill) will do.
There are two difficulties in understanding the intrinsic value of
equality in this way, that is understanding it as a value which benefits
people who live in societies in which equality prevails through
experiencing the egalitarian character of these societies. First, this
understanding limits the value of equality. It means that the intrinsic
value of distributive equality provides very little reason, if any, to
establish distributive equality among people who do not share a
14

The Value of Distributional Equality
23/10/2008 03:25:00

community. Second, it is difficult to identify any experience of living in
egalitarian communities which consists in experiencing their egalitarian
character (on analogy with experiencing life in the woods or the
mountains).
Arguably distributional equality is a precondition of various
desirable effects. Perhaps without it conflict within communities is
inevitable. Perhaps without it people are unlikely to be infused with
concern for all, and would not pursue the common good as they ought
to. But while, if sound, arguments of this kind would establish reasons
for distributional equality, they would not establish its intrinsic value. All
they can do is establish its value as a precondition for achieving other
things of value, a value which is a form of, or analogous with,
instrumental value.
4. The Person-affecting Condition
I have no conclusive argument to show that distributional equality
cannot benefit people non-instrumentally. The previous reflections
indicate the difficulty in understanding how it could benefit people,
except through its consequences or through being a precondition of
something desirable, or as a result of people believing in its value. So
perhaps it does not benefit people. Does that show that it is not
intrinsically valuable? Is the person-affecting condition true?
There is a strong presumptive case for it. It is in the way we argue
for or against the intrinsic value of many things. Two parallel lines of
argument seem to prevail. We argue by spelling out, specifying 9 , the
value. We specify what makes a friendship good, or what makes a novel

9

A term, and a method of argument, made much of by H. Richardson
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good, or a poem, or a party, or a walking holiday, and so on. At the
same time, often simultaneously, we relate that value to a wider context
which brings out why it has value. In that context we typically describe
the way what is allegedly of value benefits people who engage with it
appropriately. We describe how a good friendship enriches the life of
the friends, how reading (or writing) a good novel or poem with
understanding is rewarding or enriching, how enjoyable participating in a
good party or going on a good walking holiday would be, and so on.
Furthermore, it is difficult to make sense of the claim that values, some
values, are entirely independent of the possibility of human engagement
with them, independent of any potential to benefit people. Outside a
religious context it is difficult to see how that can be.
Two objections stand in the way. First, there are values or
putative values, other than equality, which also violate the personaffecting condition. For example, the value of retribution: meting out
retribution does not benefit anyone. As with equality so with retribution
some argue that in fact meting out retribution does benefit the people
who are so punished. But it is not clear how they can non-instrumentally
benefit by their punishment, and I will assume that they do not. Yet the
force of this counter-example is not clear. It is at least as plausible to
deny the intrinsic value of retribution as to deny the intrinsic value of
equality. The incompatibility of belief in the value of retribution and
belief in the person-affecting condition is as likely to serve as (part of) an
argument against retribution as against the person-affecting condition.
Are there more secure counter-examples? Is the value of human beings
a counter-example? My earlier observation that ‘the point of intrinsic
values is that people should relate to them in appropriate ways’ seems
not to apply to the value – often referred to as the ‘dignity’ or ‘ the
16
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moral worth’ – of people. Their value does not depend on their
existence being of possible benefit to others.
This observation is sound, but does not constitute an objection to
the person-affecting condition. It is true that the value of persons does
not depend on the benefit their existence, or their actions or attitudes
may render to others. It is often observed that the reason we have to
protect a human life does not depend on the benefit the person whose
life is in question renders or is likely to render to others. This may be an
exaggeration. In conflict, when one has to choose whom to protect or
save and it is impossible to protect all those who are at risk, the value of
people to others, the benefit they render or are likely to render to
them, may well determine the choice. Yet the stringency or importance
of the reason to protect the life of a person does not dwindle to nothing
or near nothing if the person is unlikely to benefit others. Arguably the
benefit to others is relevant only when the value of people is neutralised,
as when the choice is between two lives, but does not affect the
stringency of reasons generated by the value of people in any other
context. This fact contrasts with the reasons provided by intrinsic goods,
which, as we saw when considering Galaxy, does dwindle to nothing or
near nothing when they can do no good to anyone.
All that having be said, the (non-instrumental) value of persons
does meet the person-affecting condition simply because human
relations and interactions can be of benefit to those involved. Where my
earlier statement was wrong is in overlooking the difference between
two kinds of non-instrumental values (both meeting the person-affecting
condition). There are the familiar intrinsic values (such as autonomy,
justice, and the various valuable objects – good paintings, novels, etc. –
and activities – enjoyable partying, etc.) and there is the value of
17
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creatures, like persons who are valuable in themselves (who possess
‘moral worth’). The person-affecting condition asserts that only what can
benefit those who are of value in themselves can be of value. The
condition is met by anything valuable, whether its value is instrumental
or intrinsic or be it of value in itself. The rationale for this tripartite
division, though hard to state precisely, is fairly evident. Instrumental
goods are subservient, their ‘point’ is to secure what is of intrinsic value
and of value in itself. The ‘point’ of what is of intrinsic value is in
benefiting persons, or other creatures of value in themselves. We say of
people and certain other animals that they are of value in themselves
precisely because their existence is of value independently of any service
to anything else, even though people and other animals can also benefit
from interacting with one another, can also be of benefit to others.
This leads to the second objection. The person-affecting condition
stipulates that what is of value must be capable of benefiting people. The
previous paragraphs show that rather than referring to people it should
refer to anyone and anything that is valuable in itself. Let us accept this
emendation. More problematic is the reliance on the idea of benefiting
people. It suggests that what is good for people is independent of values,
and intrinsic values are values because they are of benefit for people in
that value-independent sense. That seems to be an incoherent view.
Roughly speaking, we benefit from an event or an action when it
facilitates acting as we have sufficient reason to act, or when we do so
act, provided the action does not disrupt our long term plans and
commitments.
This, says the objection, means that the person-affecting condition
does not rule out any putative value. If something is of value then people
have reasons to engage with it (read it if it is a novel, go to it if it is a
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party, etc.), and to protect its existence. And if it provides reasons then
it is plausible that some conditions could exist in which conforming to
those reasons will not disrupt some people’s long term plans and
commitments. Therefore so far as the person-affecting condition goes
any claim that something is of value is self-verifying. The objection fails
for it misconstrues the person-affecting condition. If possessing a certain
property makes its possessor valuable to some degree there must be an
explanation of why it is so, how possessing the property makes its
possessor valuable. The person-affecting condition stipulates that that
explanation must include an explanation of how what possesses that
property could benefit people. A proposed explanation of the value of
anything which does not explain how it could benefit people (or others
of value in themselves) fails.
Applied to equality the condition says that equality is of intrinsic
value only if it can benefit people, and that condition is not toothless. In
fact, the previous section has established that equality fails this test, and
can therefore have no intrinsic value.
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